

SPECIAL CENTER
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ORIG: CACarver, Jr.
UNIT: DCN/SAVA
EXT: [REDACTED]
DATE: 1 Feb 70

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TO: [REDACTED]	ROUTING
FROM: WASHINGTON	1 DS
SOURCE REF:	2 SAE
	3 SAVA
	4 MIPE
	5 VNO
	6 FI/D/CIB
	7
	8

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (pica)
(reference number)

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CITE

[REDACTED]

FOR COS ONLY

V/R
Hac
Chrons

1. REQUEST REUTEMAN HAVE TEXT OF PARA 4 THIS MESSAGE TYPED UP AS PERSONAL ~~TEXT~~ MESSAGE FROM MR. CARVER TO GENERAL POTTS AND DELIVER COPY UNDER APPROPRIATE BUCKSLIP TO CAPT. PIERUCKI. INTER ALIA, THIS MESSAGE IS ALSO FOR YOUR INFORMATION.
2. REQUEST OFFENBACH HAVE PARA 4 THIS MESSAGE TYPED UP AND DELIVER TO GENERAL KEEGAN AS COPY OF CARVER MESSAGE TO GENERAL POTTS. (THIS DEVICE PERMITS COUCHING MESSAGE IN PERSONAL VEIN THAT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE IN MESSAGE ADDRESSED DIRECTLY TO KEEGAN.) BUCKSLIP SHOULD NOTE THAT MESSAGE COPY BEING PASSED AT ORIGINATOR'S REQUEST TO KEEP GENERAL KEEGAN APPRISED OF DEVELOPMENTS OF INTEREST TO HIM AND OF WHICH HE MAY BE OR HAVE BEEN INFORMED THROUGH MILITARY CHANNELS.

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SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS WERE NEEDED FOR THE PRESIDENT'S CONSIDERATION, AND DIRECTED THAT THESE RECOMMENDATIONS BE DRAWN UP BY CIA IN COOPERATION WITH THE DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND DEFENSE. THE DCI ASKED ME TO OVERSEE THE PREPARATION OF THE COMMUNITY RESPONSE TO THIS WHITE HOUSE REQUEST.

(3) IN DIRECT CONVERSATION, I SUGGESTED THAT THE REQUESTED PAPER AND RECOMMENDATIONS BE PREPARED BY A SLIGHTLY EXPANDED VERSION OF THE SAME AD HOC INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE THAT ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ HAD PREPARED THE 18 JULY STUDY AND WAS ALREADY WORKING ON THE PROBLEM. DR. KISSINGER CONCURRED AND EXPLAINED IN DETAIL WHAT WAS WANTED, GIVING POLICY GUIDANCE TO OUR EFFORTS AND IN THE PROCESS SOMEWHAT BROADENING OUR TERMS OF REFERENCE. WE ARE TASKED WITH ANALYZING ALL OF THE US GOVERNMENT'S PRESENT EFFORTS THAT COLLECT INTELLIGENCE ON THE FLOW OF NORTH VIETNAMESE MANPOWER AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO THE STRUGGLE IN SOUTH VIETNAM. ON THE BASIS OF THIS ANALYSIS, WE ARE TO OFFER RECOMMENDATIONS FOR (1) MOVEMENTS ACHIEVABLE WITHIN THE PARAMETERS OF CURRENT PROGRAMS AND ASSET ALLOCATIONS AND (2) ADDITIONAL PROGRAMS, TECHNIQUES OR COLLECTION EFFORTS THAT COULD IMPROVE THE QUANTITY, QUALITY OR TIMELINESS OF THE US GOVERNMENT'S

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INTELLIGENCE ON THESE TOPICS.

(4) DR. KISSINGER EXPLAINED THAT WE SHOULD HAVE NO INHIBITIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE SCALE, SCOPE OR NATURE OF OUR RECOMMENDATIONS TO HIGHER LEVELS ON EITHER IMPROVEMENTS IN THE MIX OF CURRENT EFFORTS OR IN ADDITIONAL EFFORTS OF DEMONSTRABLE POTENTIAL VALUE. HE MADE IT VERY CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THE COMMITTEE WAS TO PRESENT ITS RECOMMENDATIONS AS A GRADED SERIES OF OPTIONS RATHER THAN IN THE FORM OF A SINGLE "ACCEPT OR REJECT" PACKAGE.

(5) THE COMMITTEE NOW WORKING ON THIS PROBLEM CONSISTS OF REPRESENTATIVES FROM APPROPRIATE COMPONENTS OF DIA, NSA, STATE AND THE AGENCY PLUS REPRESENTATIVES OF OASD/SYSTEMS ANALYSIS, ~~XXXXX~~ JCS/SACSA, J-3 (JRC), DCPC, AFXOP, AFNIC AND AFNIN. THE COOPERATIVE SPIRIT AND ENERGY WITH WHICH ALL MEMBERS HAVE FITCHED IN, KEEPING THEIR EYES CONSTANTLY FOCUSED ON THE NATIONAL INTEREST, HAS BEEN BOTH GRATIFYING AND RE-ARTENING. WE OBVIOUSLY HOPE TO PRODUCE A CONSENSUS PAPER THAT SAYS SOMETHING MEANINGFUL AND WORTHWHILE. THE RIGHT TO DISSENT (I.E., TAKE FOOTNOTES IN THE FINAL PRODUCT) WILL OF COURSE BE SCRUPULOUSLY PRESERVED IF IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES DEVELOP, BUT NONE HAVE YET MATERIALIZED.

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(6) IN OUR INITIAL DISCUSSIONS, THE COMMITTEE SHIFTLY AGREED THAT WE WERE REALLY LOOKING AT TWO RELATED BUT DIFFERENT INTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS: PERSONNEL INFILTRATION AND SUPPLY OR LOGISTICS INFILTRATION. THE FORMER WAS PRIMARILY A [REDACTED] PROBLEM IN THAT THE BULK OF OUR PRECISE, DETAILED INTELLIGENCE WAS COMINT ~~EEK~~ DERIVED AND IF OUR [REDACTED] [REDACTED] COULD BE MADE TOTALLY ADEQUATE THIS INTELLIGENCE PROBLEM WOULD BE LARGELY SOLVED. LOGISTICS INFILTRATION WAS A MORE COMPLEX MOSAIC. ESSENTIAL PIECES WERE PROVIDED BY A VARIETY OF SOURCES: COMINT, PHOTOGRAPHY, SENSORS, GROUND OBSERVERS, AGENT PENETRATIONS OF CONTROL OFFICES, ETC. FURTHERMORE, THERE WERE ~~IN~~ TWO LOGISTIC SUPPORT SYSTEMS TO CONSIDER, I.E., LAOS-DOWN AND ~~KHNNK~~ CAMBODIA (SIHANOUKVILLE)-UP. WE DECIDED TO START BY ATTACKING THE VARIOUS PIECES OF THE TOTAL PROBLEM SEPARATELY, SEEING WHAT COULD BE DONE WITHIN THE PARAMETERS OF CURRENT EFFORTS AND THEN LOOKING TO POTENTIAL FRUITFUL ADD-ONS.

(7) IN LINE WITH THE THINKING OUTLINED ABOVE, THE OVERALL GROUP HAS BROKEN INTO THREE SUBCOMMITTEES, TWO OF WHOSE TASKS ARE STRIKINGLY SIMILAR TO THOSE OF THE ICG STUDY GROUPS NOW MEETING AT CINCPAC. ONE OF OUR SUBCOMMITTEES (NSA, CIA,

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THE THIRD GROUP IS FOCUSED ON

THE ENEMY'S LOGISTICS SYSTEM. IT PROMPTLY SUBDIVIDED ITSELF INTO THREE SUB-GROUPS: ONE LOOKING AT THE LAOS SYSTEM, ONE AT THE CAMBODIA SYSTEM AND ONE CANVASSING NEW HARDWARE OR COLLECTION TECHNIQUES.

(3) THE INITIAL DRAFT SUBMISSIONS OF EACH OF THE THREE SUBCOMMITTEES WILL BE REVIEWED AND DISCUSSED BY THE WHOLE COMMITTEE ON 19 FEBRUARY. I AM SURE WE WILL NEED AT LEAST ONE MORE GO-AROUND AT THE SUBCOMMITTEE LEVEL BEFORE WE BEGIN COMBINING INPUTS INTO A SINGLE PAPER. WE HAVE NO FIRM DEADLINE BUT ARE UNDER THE GUN TO SEND THE COMPLETED STUDY AND RECOMMENDATION OPTIONS PACKAGE FORWARD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

(9) ONE OF THE FIRST OBSERVATIONS I MADE FROM THE CHAIR AT OUR INITIAL MEETING WAS THE ESSENTIAL IMPORTANCE OF HAVING THE VIEWS OF ALL CONCERNED FIELD COMPONENTS, ESPECIALLY MACV

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AND CINCPAC, ADEQUATELY VOICED, CONSIDERED AND REFLECTED IN
OUR FINAL SUBMISSION. COMMITTEE ASSENT ON THIS SCORE WAS
IMMEDIATE AND UNANIMOUS. THE MAIN SUBJECT OF THIS MESSAGE IS
TO APPRISE YOU, AND GENERAL KEEGAN, OF DEVELOPMENTS IN ORDER
TO SOLICIT YOUR THOUGHTS ON THE OPTIMUM MODE OF OBTAINING
THE NECESSARY MACV AND CINCPAC INPUTS. I REALIZE THERE ARE A
NUMBER OF COMPLEX QUESTIONS HERE INVOLVED, INCLUDING VALID
CONSIDERATIONS OF MILITARY STAFF PROCEDURE AND PROTOCOL. I AM
CERTAINLY OPEN TO ANY SUGGESTIONS YOU OR GENERAL KEE KEEGAN MAY
WANT TO OFFER, THROUGH ANY CHANNEL. WE COULD SEND ~~XXXXXXXX~~
PRELIMINARY DRAFTS OF THE COMBINED PAPER TO CINCPAC AND MACV
FOR COMMENT OR I, AT LEAST, WOULD WELCOME THE PARTICIPATION
OF MACV AND CINCPAC OFFICERS IN THE WORK OF OUR WASHINGTON
COMMITTEE. I WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING YOUR THOUGHTS ON THIS
TOPIC AS SOON AS YOU CAN CONVENIENTLY TRANSMIT THEM.

(16) IN LIGHT OF THEIR OBVIOUS CONCERN WITH THE MATTERS
CONSIDERED, I AM ASKING MY COLLEAGUES

TO SEND COPIES OF THIS MESSAGE TO

THANK YOU AGAIN FOR YOUR TIME AND COURTESY LAST
DECEMBER. WITH BEST PERSONAL REGARDS.

~~XXXXXXXX~~ END OF MESSAGE

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